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use#OAPGOVERNING WATER: THE SEMICOMMONS OF 
FLUID PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Henry E. Smith
* 
This Article applies an information-cost theory of property to water law. Because 
of its fluidity, exclusion is difficult in the case of water and gives way to rule of 
proper use, i.e., governance regimes. Looking at water through this lens reveals 
that prior appropriation employs more governance and riparianism rests more on 
a foundation of exclusion than is commonly thought. The development of 
increasing amounts of exclusion and governance are both compatible with a 
broadly Demsetzian account that is sensitive to the nature of the resource. 
Moreover, hybrids between prior appropriation and riparianism are not 
anomalous. Exclusion strategies based on boundaries and quantification allow for 
rights to be formal and modular, but this approach is particularly challenging in 
the case of water and other fugitive resources. The challenges of exclusion that 
water and other fugitive resources present often lead to a semicommons in which 
elements of private and common property both coexist and interact. 
INTRODUCTION 
Water is a fugitive resource that is expected to fulfill many human needs, 
including drinking and household uses, raising farm animals, irrigation, mining, 
power, manufacturing, sewage, navigation, wildlife, recreation, aesthetic, and 
environmental values. Some of these uses require withdrawals of water, some 
involve discharges into water, and others presuppose some quantity of water left in 
place. To serve all these ends, many parties require access to water, and at the 
same time water itself moves easily and replenishes partially (and not completely 
predictably) as part of the hydrologic cycle. Given the heterogeneity of uses, the 
costliness of measuring and monitoring them, and the difficulties in predicting 
flows of water from year to year, water is among the most challenging of resources 
from the point of view of property law. And, as we might expect, the nature of 
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water law itself has proved elusive. The fluid nature of the resource and the 
multiplicity of possible uses have led to water regimes that differ by region and 
diverge in important ways from the law of real and personal property. Water law is 
seemingly so special that many commentators have seen reflected in it their 
preferred paradigms for property law more generally and have drawn very 
different lessons from it for the problems facing water users today. 
In this Article, I apply an information-cost theory of property to water 
law. This model distinguishes two poles of a spectrum of strategies for delineating 
and enforcing property rights.
1 On the one end is the exclusion strategy which 
employs very rough proxies of access to things in order to delegate decisions over 
whole reservoirs of unspecified uses to owners.
2 By employing boundaries (and, if 
necessary, fences, etc.), the owner of Blackacre has the right to keep others out of 
Blackacre. Using this device, he can protect his interests in a wide range of uses, 
from growing crops, to maintaining a residence, to preserving habitat. The 
roughness and indirectness between the mechanism—the exclusion right—and the 
uses that are the owner’s main interests make the exclusion strategy simple and 
easy for third parties to understand, but its crudeness also leaves many problems 
unaddressed. When use by multiple parties becomes important enough, in a 
positive or negative sense, it becomes worthwhile to move toward the opposite 
pole of the spectrum of strategies and expend more delineation effort on a 
governance strategy, which prescribes proper use. Governance rules can range 
from contractual (e.g., covenants) to off-the-rack common law (nuisance) to 
statutes and regulations (e.g., zoning and pollution control). 
In the following Article, I will focus on information costs. Broadly 
speaking, these include the cost of measuring stocks or flows of a resource, and of 
delineating, monitoring, and enforcing property rights to them. Crucially, 
information costs follow from the need to select and meter various proxies.
3 Thus, 
crossing a boundary onto land is a very rough proxy for use of or harm to land, 
whereas measurement of a volume of pollution can involve increasingly precise 
proxies for the harm to humans (amount discharged, location, dissipation patterns, 
etc.). If information costs are as important as I hypothesize them to be, a partial 
model emphasizing information costs should shed some light on the direction of 
evolution of rights to water. Moreover, important aspects of water rights, such as 
the need for groups of users to organize politically, are related to information 
costs. Groups that advocate uses that are easier to measure can more readily 
organize in the political process and push through their proposals.
4 Broadly 
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speaking, transaction costs are institution costs, which include the costs of the 
information required to establish, maintain, and use them. That is, information 
costs play a role in most aspects of the demand for and supply of institutions.
5 
Nevertheless, in its focus on information costs, the model here is deliberately only 
a partial one. 
Water stocks are inherently uncertain and the multiple interacting uses of 
water form a complex system. Water law employs a variety of strategies to deal 
with this complexity. The two main systems in the common law of water are 
riparianism characteristic of Eastern states, in which owners of land abutting 
watercourses have a right to reasonable use of the water, and prior appropriation, 
characteristic of some Western states, in which priority rights to use water are 
established by diversion for beneficial use.
6 As in the rest of property law, some 
complexity can be managed by cabining off parts of the system into modules, 
within which interaction is intense but between which interaction is sparse and 
stereotyped.
7 Thus, who the owner of a parked car is or what his attributes are 
becomes irrelevant to the duty not to steal or damage the car.
8 What a landowner is 
doing on Blackacre is less relevant to outside tortfeasors than one might think.
9 
The exclusion strategy allows such modularization, and in the case of land much 
(but not nearly all) of what an owner does and who she is can be hidden behind the 
boundary of a modular property right. Only when conflicts become high in stakes 
is it worth enriching the interface, as in covenants, nuisance, and zoning. In the 
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case of water, as we will see, basic water law seeks to manage uncertainty and 
complexity through basic modules (priority in prior appropriation, appurtenancy to 
land in riparianism), but because of its fugitive nature, modularization through the 
exclusion strategy needs to give way quickly to richer interfaces through the 
governance strategy. Delineation of rights in terms of use and regulation of 
activities with respect to water have always played, and promise to continue to 
play, a large role in all the common law water systems, prior appropriation, 
riparian, and hybrid alike. 
Because water is fugitive, it is generally recognized that exclusion in the 
sense of land or chattels is somehow difficult.
10 Indeed, Blackstone, in a somewhat 
exaggerated fashion, thought that by definition property in water had to be 
usufructory.
11 The information-cost theory allows a more refined and accurate 
version of this proposition and several others that can be derived and tested. With 
most resources, the marginal costs of exclusion rise as more precision is called for: 
think of trying to use fences, or even conditional exclusion rules alone, in trying to 
prevent hired hands from pilfering from a farm.
12 In the case of water—like other 
fugitive resources—the marginal cost of employing the exclusion strategy rises 
especially quickly; demarcating a specific instance of moving water is 
problematic, and water is valued for hard-to-measure attributes, like timing and 
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Brown v. Vandegrift, 80 Pa. 142, 148 (1875)). On traditional criticisms of the rule of 
capture, see Craft, supra, at 707–10. 
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transient, usufructuary property therein: wherefore, if a body of water 
runs out of my pond into another man’s, I have no right to reclaim it. 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *18. 
  12.  Dogs can be trained to guard boundaries but not to monitor activities by 
those with authorized access. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 
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properties of flow, none of which are amenable to a simple fencing strategy 
analogous to the one used in land.
13 Measuring quantities of flowing water, much 
less possessing an entire watercourse, is a nontrivial exercise. This makes a focus 
on use relatively more attractive. A shift to governance strategies that deal with 
particular classes of uses will occur more readily in the case of water than in the 
case of other comparably valuable resources. 
Although prior appropriation is more exclusion-based than riparianism, 
both of the major common law water systems, in comparison to nonfugitive 
property regimes, mix small amounts of exclusion with large and increasing 
amounts of governance. In the case of the riparianism that is common in Eastern 
states, the emphasis on reasonable use makes the system look like one of 
governance. But I will argue that the riparian system, like other property systems, 
employs exclusion as a first cut at the problem of water overuse, and relies on 
exclusion to an extent greater than is usually recognized.
14 Perhaps more 
surprisingly, the prior appropriation system characteristic of the arid Western 
states, which is conventionally thought of as a parcelized system of private 
exclusion rights, in fact relies heavily on the governance strategy.
15 The 
information-cost theory suggests reasons for the heavy focus on uses in prior 
appropriation, in addition to the basic exclusion-like priority scheme. Some 
otherwise puzzling aspects of prior appropriation that look wasteful from the point 
of view of conventional private property make sense in terms of reducing the costs 
of delineating and enforcing water rights under the governance aspect of an 
appropriation regime. 
The special combination of minimal exclusion and elaborate governance 
in both riparianism and prior appropriation (and not only in hybrid regimes) leads 
to a semicommons.
16 A semicommons exists where private and common property 
overlap and potentially interact.
17 A semicommons is particularly likely in the case 
of water because basic exclusion is difficult. This difficulty of exclusion starts with 
one of water’s aspects as a public good: preventing access to the resource is costly. 
First, it is costly to monitor access by multiple potential appropriators. Second, 
preventing access by all but one user is undesirable in that one user often cannot 
make full use of the watercourse. This is particularly true where many types of 
uses can co-exist in theory but strategic behavior is a danger. As a result, the 
private claims of various users overlap, and are overlaid with group and public 
rights. The semicommons theory also raises the possibility that mixtures of 
elements of riparianism and first-appropriation can be cost-effective. By contrast, 
commentary has favored nonhybrid systems and tended to regard riparianism and 
prior appropriation as pure systems and other combinations and compromises as 
inherently deviant and unstable.
18 Combining systems does lead to challenges of 
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conflict and strategic behavior at their intersection, but if multiple use is valuable 
enough, it makes sense to tolerate some such behavior or to deal with it through 
governance regimes often employed in a semicommons. The uneasy compromises 
in water law are at least theoretically a second-best solution to the problem of a 
fugitive resource that lends itself to multiple types of valuable uses. 
The Article begins in Part I with an overview of water law through the 
lens of prior accounts. It shows that these views tend to emphasize important 
aspects of water law that lead either to exclusion on the one hand or governance on 
the other, but largely ignore the other type of strategy. Part II will present a simple 
information-cost theory of property rights, which derives propositions about how 
exclusion and governance will be deployed, based on their marginal costs and 
benefits and changes to these quantities over time. Part III shows how riparianism 
and prior appropriation both combine small amounts of exclusion and 
(increasingly) elaborate governance, as compared to regular property in 
nonfugitive resources. In Part IV, I argue that water law tends to be a 
semicommons, as in the case of fugitive resources more generally. 
I. THE NATURE OF WATER LAW 
Existing economically oriented accounts of water law appear to contradict 
each other. In terms of the model offered here, each of the existing theories 
emphasizes only part of the story, exclusion or governance.  
The most familiar account of water law is Demsetzian. In his landmark 
1967 article, Harold Demsetz argued that property rights emerge when the benefits 
of internalizing externalities exceed the costs of internalization.
19 Rising resource 
values or decreases in the cost of definition and enforcement should lead us to 
expect the emergence of property rights, although Demsetz largely left out of the 
model any specifics about the process by which this would happen on the supply 
side.
20 The Demsetz model, as I have argued elsewhere, is compatible with the rise 
of common property out of open access and the adoption of increasingly stringent 
governance rules once common property has been established.
21 But many, 
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including Demsetz himself, expected parcelization and private property to be the 
universal tendency for valuable resources.
22 Late in his article, Demsetz makes the 
additional assumption that internalization in communal property is prohibitively 
costly.
23 Indeed, Demsetz seems to equate common property with open access 
when he says “[c]ommunal property rights allow anyone to use the land.”
24 As 
many have pointed out, especially in connection with Hardin’s Tragedy of the 
Commons,
25 common property—as opposed to open access—involves excluding 
all but a group (sometimes called the commoners) from access to the common 
resource, and can involve rules and norms governing the behavior of those with 
access.
26 Indeed, the historical example of the grazing commons was not tragic for 
precisely this reason.
27 Whether or not any given commons is optimal is a difficult 
question, but the combination of exclusion and governance in common property 
allowed common grazing areas to avoid tragedy for centuries.
28 Some such areas 
survive even today.
29  
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COOPERATION,  CONFLICT, AND LAW 74–82, 84–85 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. 
McChesney eds., 2003); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, 
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); see also Alison Rieser, 
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Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 399–400 (1999). 
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This Demsetzian ambiguity about common property and open access 
extends to water. As an example of the difficulties with “communal property,” 
Demsetz offers the problem of negotiations between a farmer who wants a stream 
as it is and someone else who wants to dam it: in private property this involves the 
negotiation between two parties (adjacent landowners), but in “communal 
property” it would involve everyone.
30 Distinguishing only private property and 
open access ignores the possibility that water might be (limited access) common 
property, which belongs to a group but not the world at large.
31 
At first blush, Western water law looks like Exhibit A for the Demsetzian 
theory.
32 Although prior appropriation rights arose first in mining camps on federal 
lands, and the federal government did not make clear its acceptance of prior 
appropriation until the Mining Act of 1866,
33 Eastern riparianism (or the older 
natural flow theory) was the received common law approach and became the 
baseline for later developments in U.S. water law.
34 Riparianism was a common 
property regime characterized by rules of reasonableness, with a requirement of 
injury.
35 For example, if an upper riparian dams a river, a riparian farmer needing 
the water for irrigation would normally have a claim. Water has been relatively 
plentiful in the East—especially at the time the riparian doctrine formed in the 
nineteenth century—and conflicts over water, while not unknown, were not as 
intense as in the West. In the more arid West, water is scarcer, giving rise to more 
important externalities, and as expected private exclusive property rights (on this 
view of prior appropriation) emerge to internalize them. An earlier appropriator of 
water for a beneficial use, even on land in another watershed, has a right to the 
amount of water necessary for this use, as against any later appropriator. Language 
in Western judicial opinions, most notably in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., only 
serves to reinforce the role of scarcity in the “parcelization” of Western water.
36 
                                                                                                                  
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CUSTOMS AND CULTURE: INFORMAL SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMONS 
PROBLEM 109, 110 (Terry L. Anderson & Randy T. Simmons eds., 1993). 
  30.  Demsetz, supra note 19, at 357. 
  31.  See, e.g., Lueck, supra note 10, at 427–28; Carol M. Rose, Energy and 
Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 262, 
293–95 (1990). 
  32.  See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: 
A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 176–78 (1975); see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.2, at 40–42 (5th ed. 1998). 
  33.  Ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 661 
(2006)). 
  34.  See, e.g., M. CATHERINE  MILLER, FLOODING THE COURTROOMS: LAW AND 
WATER IN THE FAR WEST 10–66 (1993). 
  35.  Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (Story, J.); Rose, 
supra note 31, at 264. 
  36.  6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882). The court stated:  
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual 
rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections, 
artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in the 
various streams thus acquires a value unknown in moister climates. 
Instead of being a mere incident to the soil, it rises, when appropriated, 
to the dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate, or right of property. 2008] GOVERNING  WATER  453 
Commentators in this tradition point to the priority system as the basis for 
exclusive rights.
37 Also, water decrees are formulated in terms of quantity, as are 
opinions in cases involving change of use and transfer. As we will see, these uses 
of quantity measures are a little misleading, but they do give the impression of 
exclusion-based rights.
38 Later, we will see that the idea that “more property” in 
the Western regime need not mean parcelization. Rather, the greater property 
rights effort expected on Demsetz’s framework can take the form of increasingly 
articulated governance regimes. 
Many in the Demsetzian tradition recognize that scarcity has not led to 
monotonic increases in the clear definition, exclusivity, and transferability of 
rights, as one would expect from prior appropriation on the narrow version of the 
Demsetz thesis.
39 Consider some features of prior appropriation law that fit 
uneasily into the simple Demsetzian “parcelization” story. On the narrow 
Demsetzian point of view, on which rising resource values give rise to 
parcelization—more private property and rights to exclude in particular—several 
features of Western water law appear anomalous and wasteful. The use-it-or-lose-
it quality of Western water law makes little sense because it encourages needless 
use simply in order to maintain rights.
40 Likewise, the traditional conserved water 
doctrine, under which saved water (for example, from improving the lining of 
irrigation ditches) is forfeited, seems particularly perverse in that it provides little 
incentive to conserve.
41  
The traditional difficulty of, and hostility to, transfers of water rights also 
makes little sense on the Demsetzian view.
42 Part of the difficulty is that the 
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statutes have been passed to allow appropriators to keep certain types of water (e.g., 
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Western system protects return flows without measuring them. If A appropriates 
enough water to irrigate 100 acres, and this leads to a return flow, B who is 
downstream can appropriate any and all of the return flow. If A wants to change 
the point of diversion or the nature of the use, then B has a right to the return flow 
the same as it was beforehand if required for her appropriative use. In other words, 
any change proposed by A cannot diminish later appropriative rights to return 
flow. Because this no-injury rule makes rights hard to transfer independently of 
land and makes a transfer to a new use particularly difficult, private property 
theorists tend to recommend that Western water law become more parcelized by 
defining rights in terms of consumption.
43 As we will see, others have pointed out 
that third-party effects remain.
44 Indeed for Demsetzians and others who see 
Western water law as a private property system trying to come out of its shell, the 
answer is to more rigorously apply the exclusion paradigm and so (on this view) to 
push the Demsetzian evolution further along.
45 
Finally, historical developments have not wholly accorded with the 
exclusive-rights version of the Demsetz thesis. As Carol Rose points out, at earlier 
stages of Eastern water law, a prior appropriation theory was available and could 
have been used more extensively in developing Eastern water law.
46 Even if it 
somehow was not worth the trouble to parcelize at that stage, water in the East is 
scarcer today. But instead of moving toward prior appropriation, water law in the 
East is moving toward a regulated riparianism under which the basic riparian 
system is overlaid with regulation and official permits.
47 Such systems vary but 
tend to at least require a permit for large new consumptive uses of water and allow 
for greater regulatory decision-making authority in the case of water conflicts. If 
these permits become tradable, the evolution seems far from the narrow 
Demsetzian progression from “communal” to “private,” but is consistent with the 
broader version of the Demsetz thesis. 
Others take the opposite approach, emphasizing the governance aspect of 
both riparianism and prior appropriation and holding it up as an ideal for property 
law more generally.
48 Riparianism can be fruitfully regarded as a common 
property regime, and like other common property regimes, it relies heavily on ex 
post standards to contain the tragic tendencies of common property regimes.
49 The 
rule of reasonable use limits the activities of those with access and largely prevents 
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major consumptive diversions.
50 Eric Freyfogle argues that prior appropriation has 
moved away from what I would call exclusion towards a governance regime in 
which “[a]utonomous, secure property rights have largely given way to use 
entitlements that are interconnected and relative.”
51 Freyfogle’s focus is on 
California’s hybrid of prior appropriation and riparian water law, and he points to 
restrictions on riparian rights that use must be reasonable and to doctrines like the 
public trust that impose a layer of public rights on top of private rights in water.
52 
But he also interestingly points out the governance elements in prior appropriation 
itself. Most obviously, like riparianism in many states, prior appropriation has 
acquired a regulatory overlay, in which permits are required and authorities are 
increasingly empowered to take third-party and even the public interest into 
account when considering requests for changes in use or transfers of water rights.
53 
But Freyfogle argues that water rights are not just undergoing regulation but also 
redefinition in a more complex, context-sensitive, and correspondingly less 
exclusionary direction.
54 To Freyfogle, a landmark case is In re Water of Hallett 
Creek Stream System,
55 in which the California Supreme Court decided that the 
federal government impliedly reserved riparian water rights on land designated for 
particular federal purposes.
56 But even fairly traditional aspects of the prior 
appropriation system—like the no-injury rule, in which changes in use and 
transfers must preserve return flows being used by downstream appropriators—
make prior appropriation more use-based (and more governance-like in our terms) 
than appears in most of the commentary.
57 Most fundamentally, Freyfogle 
emphasizes that water rights are inherently use rights, giving rise to a 
nonexclusive, use-based, interconnected system of rights that takes many 
contextual factors and diverse interests into account.
58 According to Freyfogle, this 
element of governance has increased in recent years. The new, even more 
contextual rights regime takes responsibilities more seriously and puts more 
government effort into choosing the combination of uses that will prevail.
59 
Overall, the system of water rights is a “complex web of mutual dependencies,”
60 
such that the “water-using clan” is “[n]ow structured by connectedness rather than 
by hierarchy.”
61 
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To Freyfogle, the interconnected use-based nature of water rights under 
both riparianism and prior appropriation (and especially the hybrid Californian 
system upon which he spends the most attention) is the wave of the future.
62 In his 
view, Californian water rights bear little resemblance to traditional concepts of 
property—by which he means rights to exclude—and he believes that the rest of 
property law can learn from this trend in water law.
63 Freyfogle taps into a strong 
skepticism about traditional exclusive property rights and concepts that is 
characteristic of Legal Realism and its successor movements.
64 In our terms, the 
claim is that as the interactivity and importance of third-party effects become more 
important we will not only get more delineation effort but that it will take the form 
of more governance, even to the partial exclusion of the exclusion strategy. 
One question that remains on Freyfogle’s account of the Legal Realist 
perspective more generally is what role if any exclusion still plays. Descriptively it 
does play a role, and I will argue that the nature of water, and certain other 
resources like intellectual property and broadcast spectrum, call for exclusion that 
is more limited but still importantly forms a platform for further governance. 
Because exclusion is very costly and the marginal cost of exclusion rises very 
rapidly in the case of these fugitive resources, the shift to governance happens 
quickly. Also, because exclusion is limited by the nature of the resource, the 
mixture of exclusion and governance tends in the direction of a semicommons. It is 
interesting in this regard to note that Freyfogle takes as his main example 
California, the most hybrid of the Western water regimes. Exclusion is not 
Freyfogle’s focus, and we still need a theory of how much and what types of 
exclusion different conditions in water law require. 
One major step toward answering this question is, as Carol Rose has 
argued, to derive some consequences for entitlement delineation from the nature of 
the resource and its potential uses.
65 Rose argues that Eastern and Western water 
law developed along different tracks because of the different nature of the uses to 
which water is put in the two areas.
66 In the East during the formative period of 
riparian water law, water was used mainly for water power in addition to minor 
consumptive household uses, etc. The watercourse was thus more valuable as a 
whole and could be used by riparians in turn.
67 Uses were nonconsumptive, 
making the water approximate a public good. Also, in the case of a long river with 
many water-powered mills, the number of riparians is large (but not as large as it 
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would be if nonriparians had access), so that some judicial off-the-rack rules along 
the lines of nuisance make some sense.
68 
By contrast, in the West, water was and is used for a variety of 
consumptive purposes, ranging from mining to irrigation and, these days, 
municipal consumption. Accordingly, prior appropriation developed to deal with 
these irreconcilable potential uses of the water; for example, in times of drought, 
two irrigators could not use the same water.
69 Greater parcelization makes sense 
and is consistent even with the narrow version of the Demsetz thesis. What seems 
to contradict Demsetz is the rejection of early examples of appropriation in the law 
of some Eastern states like Massachusetts in favor of the less parcelized riparian 
system.
70 According to Rose’s account, Western water law is not necessarily a 
higher, more developed stage than Eastern riparianism.
71 Instead, depending on the 
nature of the resource—or more accurately the set of uses to which a resource is to 
be put—common property can be the more viable regime. 
Basing the explanation of the riparian versus prior appropriation split on 
the nature of water use (public versus private/consumptive) might lead us to expect 
systems to gravitate to either riparianism or prior appropriation. Consistent with 
Rose’s theory, California’s climate is intermediate between those of the riparian 
and pure prior appropriation states. Other states that recognize some historical 
riparian rights are also intermediate. It may be that the closer mix of consumptive 
and nonconsumptive uses make these hybrids worthwhile, but the literature usually 
assumes that hybrids are wasteful.
72 Interestingly, Mark Kanazawa in a study of 
the California doctrine provides evidence that the hybrid system is consistent with 
efficiency.
73 Claiming that doctrine rather than efficiency drove results, Joshua 
Getzler notes that at least the English riparian system had elements of 
appropriation in it and that this split within riparianism did not track the distinction 
between flooding cases (on Rose’s theory amenable to a prior appropriation 
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approach) and withdrawal cases (in which high transaction costs would be 
expected to lead riparianism to hold sway).
74  
Furthering the recognition implicit in these discussions, I will argue that 
hybrids are to be expected on an information-cost theory of water law in which 
exclusion gives way quickly to governance. More generally, this Article questions 
whether either system, prior appropriation or riparianism, has as unitary a 
character as these accounts often suggest. I will argue that prior appropriation and 
riparianism both mix elements of exclusion and governance, with heavy reliance 
on the latter, making both systems a type of semicommons. 
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR WATER LAW 
Both prior appropriation and riparianism combine elements of exclusion 
and governance. Existing accounts of prior appropriation overemphasize exclusion 
and overlook governance, and the conventional view of riparianism tends 
conversely to regard it as a pure governance regime, with scant attention to 
exclusion. Although prior appropriation is more exclusion-based than riparianism, 
both systems shift toward governance regimes more readily than in the case of 
nonfugitive property, as the following discussion illustrates.  
Water is a special type of property, and this Part will apply a framework 
developed to derive propositions about the contours of property rights in general to 
the water resource in particular. Generally, strategies for delineating property 
rights can be arrayed along a spectrum running from exclusion to governance. 
These poles are defined by the nature of the informational variables used to define 
the right (or, to use the term from neoinstitutional economics, proxy 
measurement).
75 For exclusion in land law, we use simple on/off signals like 
boundary crossings (trespass, some nuisance) or more tailored variables involving 
the evaluation of conflicting uses (other nuisance law). These informational 
variables come with their own characteristic cost structures: the supply of 
exclusion and governance (and stages in between) involves increasing marginal 
costs—but increasing at different rates. 
Because it relies on rough proxies, the exclusion strategy delegates 
decisions about resource use to an owner who, as gatekeeper, takes responsibility 
for deciding on uses and monitoring compliance with her plan. Exclusion-style 
informational variables (or proxies) are simple and crude, like boundaries and the 
ad coelum rule.
76 Presence outside or inside the boundary is effective—but 
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overinclusive—when it comes to preventing misuse such as pilfering of crops.
77 
Exclusion also does little by itself to facilitate use by multiple parties—often 
important in water law—for which governance rules will often be needed. As we 
will see, the very fact that these proxies make irrelevant a lot of internal 
information about assets and their owners contributes to the modularity of 
property. The right to exclude from a thing indirectly protects the owner in a wide 
range of potential and actual uses, without the law ever having to delineate these 
use-privileges separately. Dutyholders have the simple job of keeping off, unless 
they have permission. 
Because of its indirectness and simplicity, exclusion is not good at 
dealing with specific high-stakes use conflicts, and it is here that the governance 
strategy comes to the fore. Governance rules require the specification of proper 
activities; examples include rules about timing and amounts of grazing by herders 
with access to a common grazing area.
78 Governance rules can be supplied by 
contract, common law, statute, regulation, as well as social norms. 
Some rough assumptions about the marginal costs of these strategies (and 
those in between) lead to a simple partial information-cost model of property rights 
delineation. The marginal benefit of precision in delineation strategies comes from 
the additional internalization of spillovers from particular uses and the facilitation 
of multiple use; this marginal benefit is represented by a (downward-sloping) 
demand curve. The various delineation (and enforcement) strategies have 
characteristically shaped supply curves. Without deciding whether the process of 
forming property rights itself exhibits net positive or negative externalities, one 
can see that the supply curve for property rights is made up of the envelope of the 
supply curves for the various strategies, as in Figure 1, with wealth ($) depicted on 
the y-axis and precision depicted on the x-axis:
79 
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Figure 1.—Exclusion and governance for a resource
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The supply curve for property rights is made up of the lowest part of the 
cost curves for the various strategies (the envelope of those curves); I take two 
representative curves to depict polar solutions of exclusion and governance, out of 
the many curves that could contribute to the supply side.
80 Costs include, for 
example, the cost of marking a boundary and building a fence, and distinguishing 
presence inside a boundary (which would be exclusion-like) or levels of uses or 
their values (which would be governance-like). Because the marginal cost of 
exclusion (“MCE”) starts out low at low levels of precision and increases rapidly it 
is typically the first approach to defining a resource and preventing the most basic 
types of theft and use conflict. And, as we will see, MCE can be expected to rise 
even more rapidly in the case of water because of its fugitive nature and the 
importance of multiple types of use, all requiring access to the entire watercourse.  
Governance starts out with high marginal costs (“MCG”)—think of trying 
to solve all use conflicts use-by-use or defining property stick-by-stick, with no 
recourse to exclusion rights. But by hypothesis, governance costs rise less quickly 
and at some point become least cost (part of the envelope). The marginal cost 
curve for governance, MCG, is the lower of the two strategy-specific marginal cost 
curves only to the right of the intersection with MCE. Again, because exclusion is 
especially difficult at more than minimal levels of precision in the case of water, 
we should expect a heavy role for governance in water law. And this we find in all 
water law systems—riparian, prior appropriation, and hybrid alike. 
As marginal costs and benefits shift, we can derive predicted trends in the 
delineation of property rights. The optimal degree of precision occurs where the 
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curve for marginal benefit (“MB”) of precision in delineation—in terms of 
incentives to invest, internalization, and gains from specialization and multiple 
use—intersects with the supply curve of delineation. As the MB curve shifts out—
say because of an increase in the value of a resource or the more intense use 
conflict—we expect an increase in the precision of property rights: in Figure 1 a 
shift from MB to MB" leads to an increase in precision from p* to p"*. So to the 
extent that the model picks up on the relevant costs of property rights, broadly 
taken to include institution costs, then the predicted level of precision will 
approximate to p*. Perhaps more importantly, because easier to test empirically, as 
the marginal costs and benefits shift, we can derive implications for trends in 
levels of property rights precision. 
In the case of water, as mentioned above, exclusion is more difficult than 
in the case of land. It is difficult to fence off water, especially if the watercourse is 
best used by multiple parties. In terms of the present model, this means that MCE 
rises more steeply than in the case of land. As a result, for similar levels of 
marginal benefit we would expect a more rapid shift over to the governance 
strategy as in Figure 2, which, as we will see in the next Part, is in fact what we 
find. 
Figure 2.—Exclusion and governance for water
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More dynamically, the shape of this envelope—the supply curve for 
property rights—will change if individual components—the MCE and MCG 
curves do not move in tandem. The contrast of land and water can be traced to the 
rapid rise in MCE. But this model also implies that if information technology 
improved a given type of strategy (exclusion or governance) more than the other, 
we would expect an internal shift in the shape of the curve (i.e., not necessarily on 
the overall margin). So, for example, as measurement of quantities of water 462  ARIZONA LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 50:445 
becomes cheaper and more effective with more meters, better models, and satellite 
monitoring—the MCE curve might shift down by itself and, all else equal, we 
would expect a tendency toward greater relative reliance on exclusion, as in Figure 
3, even if the benefits of entitlement delineation do not change: 
Figure 3.—Relative decrease in marginal cost of exclusion
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Because the individual informational variables’ cost curves have 
shifted—here the marginal cost of exclusion has shifted downward—we can 
expect changes in the “switch point,” at which a new strategy becomes least-cost, 
from s to s'. That is, as exclusion becomes relatively less costly, exclusion remains 
least cost over a larger range. Here, a switch from exclusion to governance is 
expected to occur later, as long as conditions under which actors decide to 
delineate property rights give us some reason to believe that the system has some 
tendency to move in the direction of efficiency.
81 
The quantities in this model are in principle measurable. Nevertheless, 
when shifts happen on both the cost and benefit sides, the interpretation of data can 
be tricky. If, as is particularly relevant to water law, the marginal benefit of 
delineation increases, but the marginal cost of governance likewise increases, we 
might get no increase in precision at the margin but a greater relative reliance on 
exclusion (because the switch point from exclusion to governance would move 
rightward): 
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Figure 4.—Equal shift in marginal governance cost and benefit
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I will not argue that riparian and prior appropriation law are equal in their 
levels of precision: not only is it hard to tell at this point whether in each case the 
shift in marginal benefit equals the shift in the marginal cost of governance, but the 
two systems are hard to compare in terms of precision (although, again, this should 
in principle be possible). Rather, the possibility illustrated in Figure 4 is a warning 
that shifts can occur on the cost and on the benefit side, and if so the overall level 
of precision is to be treated with care. Because governance costs may have risen in 
the West, we may not get the level of precision at the margin we might otherwise 
expect. Finally, we can hypothesize that in the case of public good use of water (as 
tends to be more true in the East), the marginal cost of exclusion rises more rapidly 
(MCEe) than in the West (MCEw), as in Figure 5: 464  ARIZONA LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 50:445 
Figure 5.—Greater marginal exclusion costs for public goods
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If so, we might find relatively more reliance on exclusion in the West 
even in the absence of greater marginal benefit of governance (and of precision 
overall), which might nevertheless also be present. 
As we will see in the next Part, broadly speaking Western water law 
shows: (i) a somewhat greater reliance on exclusion than riparianism; (ii) possibly 
greater but not vastly greater efforts at governance; and (iii) a greater overall effort 
at delineation than in riparianism. Phenomena (i) and (iii) follow from the model in 
conjunction with basic assumptions about total and marginal cost, and (ii) is 
consistent with the model. This picture of the Western prior appropriation system 
is consistent in its outlines with the broader version of the Demsetz thesis. 
Because governance is typically active at the margin of precision, when 
high stakes call for a high degree of precision, at some point it becomes worth 
policing governance-style signals or tolerating some deterioration (or both). That 
is, where high measurement cost is worthwhile, this can take the form of 
delineating uses and users in a fine-grained way, policing of the rights delineated, 
and tolerating residual losses from manipulation and deterioration of the signals 
used. Increasing precision can take the form of exceptions to exclusion, as in the 
doctrine of necessity in which the owner’s right to exclude is suspended, or 
reduced to liability rule protection. Likewise, under an uncontroversial exception 
to the rough and ready ad coelum rule, owners cannot exclude high-altitude 2008] GOVERNING  WATER  465 
airplane overflights.
82 Governance can also take the familiar form of rules of 
proper use, especially those that balance individual uses against each other, as 
sometimes occurs in the law of nuisance and riparian water law. 
Exclusion and governance together determine how modular the property 
system will be. Modularity is a method for dealing with complexity in systems. A 
complex system is one characterized by numerous interactions or 
interdependencies, making it difficult to infer the properties of the whole system 
from the parts and their modes of interaction.
83 Sometimes systems can be 
decomposed into components within which dependencies are numerous and free 
but between which interactions conform to a much lower level. These components 
are called modules, which have the effect of hiding much information so that the 
encapsulated components interconnect only in certain ways. This encapsulation 
allows work to go on in parallel and facilitates certain kinds of innovation and 
evolution because adjustment can happen within modules without causing major 
ripple effects. The concept of a modular system was of key importance to Herbert 
Simon, a founder of behavioral economics, and has played a role in cognitive 
science and cognitive economics more generally.
84  
As I have argued elsewhere, the exclusion strategy in property lends the 
system of entitlements a modular character because much information about 
owners and their uses is irrelevant to dutyholders who simply have to keep off.
85 
Part of the low marginal cost at low levels of precision for exclusion strategies 
(like that illustrated in Figure 1) stems from the effective management of 
complexity through modular rights based on rough proxies like land boundaries. 
Governance rules make the system less modular or can be thought of as relatively 
complex interface conditions. To do so requires incurring ever-increasing marginal 
costs, as illustrated for the governance strategy in the figures, in order to attain 
greater precision of proxies at these interfaces. For example, elaborate balancing 
rules of nuisance constitute a complex interface between the property rights of 
adjacent landowners. At the limit, resolving all use conflicts case-by-case, use-by-
use, would be fully nonmodular. 
Because exclusion is costly in water law, water law exhibits a powerful 
tendency toward governance and nonmodularity, as we will see. Even under prior 
appropriation, rights have a tendency to interlock in the sense of one right 
depending on another for its content, which is dramatically true of the no-injury 
rule. Strong interdependencies between rights lessen the degree of modularity and 
its resemblance to classic property. This tendency toward nonmodularity in water 
law captures Blackstone’s intuition that water law is inherently usufructory. The 
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interaction between rights in water law will turn out to be intense enough to make 
it worthwhile to analyze water law as a type of semicommons. 
III. EXCLUSION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON LAW OF 
WATER 
Water law tends to be viewed as either private property on the one hand 
or as a pure tort-like commons or a regulatory regime on the other. In terms of the 
information-cost theory, existing water law commentary tends to depict prior 
appropriation as an exclusion regime and riparianism as one of governance of use. 
In this Part, I argue that both regimes mix substantial elements of both strategies, 
exclusion and governance. Because water is both fugitive and subject to many 
types of very different uses, the shift from exclusion to governance happens more 
readily than in the case of non-fugitive property. Prior appropriation is to a large 
extent a governance regime, rather than being as parcelized as it is often portrayed. 
Conversely, riparianism, though indeed a regime based on governance-type 
balancing of uses, rests on a larger foundation of exclusion than is usually thought. 
It is important also to keep in mind that the common law of water, while 
the main focus here, is not the only institution used to mediate water conflicts. 
Instead, many other institutions, ranging from personal contracts among 
appropriators to mutuals, water districts, and public regulators, can supply the 
exclusion and, especially, the governance rules needed to increase the usefulness 
of water.
86 Some of the shifts in water governance reflect the substitution of one 
institution of governance for another. For example, the rise of riparianism may 
have substituted off-the-rack judicial (and jury) governance for private 
agreements.
87 And permit systems are in the process of replacing some of 
riparianism and prior appropriation’s governance aspects with public regulation— 
much as zoning and land use regulations have partially displaced nuisance law in 
the case of land. But like nuisance, the two main common-law water systems 
combine elements of exclusion and governance, to which I now turn. 
A. Governance in prior appropriation 
In many accounts, prior appropriation is presented as a private property 
regime of exclusive transferable rights, in aspiration if not in fact. On such 
accounts, certain features of the system, past and present, are regarded as 
puzzlingly inconsistent with prior appropriation’s status as a classic private 
property regime and only serve as unnecessary obstacles to the full realization of 
the efficiency made possible by a system of exclusive private property rights. In 
this Section, I argue that prior appropriation is in fact more of a governance 
regime, based on rules of proper use, than the conventional picture recognizes. 
Overall, prior appropriation employs temporal priority to achieve modularity but 
quickly shifts to rules of proper use. 
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The most familiar aspect of prior appropriation is, as its name suggests, 
the first-in-time method of allocating priority of rights. Prior appropriation gives 
priority based on the date of issuance of a water certificate but the right must be 
used within a reasonable length of time in order to vest.
88 Prior appropriation 
employs priority to prevent the class of appropriators from becoming too large; by 
contrast, in riparianism, land ownership (and sometimes use of water on the land 
or at least the watershed) is used to set up basic exclusion. If riparianism’s 
restriction to riparians is lifted to widen the class of potential users, which as 
David Schorr argues was its main purpose, then the danger would be that 
additional appropriators might come along and reduce the size of each water right 
to an unusably small quantity.
89 If a stream is being used by ten appropriators who 
have a pro rata right (1/10), each pro rata right will become smaller as the number 
of users grows (1/n shrinks as n increases). By giving priority of right to earlier 
appropriators, later appropriators do not cause uses to become inefficiently small; 
the newcomers are just less likely to get any water.
90 A new junior appropriator 
would have to divert water in order to have any rights at all: no diversion, no right. 
And if there are many senior rights making divertable water a rarity, the right will 
become correspondingly hard to invoke.
91 
What if earlier uses are not as valuable as later ones? We will return to 
the question of transfers later, but consider for now another benefit of the priority 
scheme—its modularity. Senior appropriators are highly likely to have their needs 
satisfied, whereas junior appropriators are much less likely to get water in times of 
scarcity. Some uses depend on a certain flow (and more particularly a certain flow 
at certain times), and others do not (they are less sensitive or can depend on 
alternative supply or storage). For example, some crops need water at certain times 
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only, and crops that are not so thirsty can receive an amount of water that can be 
stored from a relatively wet time of year. Priority allows users with these 
characteristics to satisfy their needs without the need to measure the overall 
stream. Those with high priority need not know much about lower priority uses 
and risks. Those with lower priority know with relative ease which risks and what 
activities will and will not impact them. The scheme unfolds like asset partitioning 
in organizational law: by segregating pools of assets, those involved in 
organizations need only know about what they are best at monitoring and can 
largely disregard the creditors of owners or other related businesses with little 
risk.
92 To take another analogy, dividing up risk pools in securitization can make 
the risk cheaper to measure overall and to monitor than if risks were not so 
partitioned.
93 In all of these areas, modularity provides its familiar benefits of 
making complexity manageable and allowing for greater specialization of 
information.  
In water law, specialization of information through modularity is 
achieved through the priority scheme. Most basically, the priority scheme makes a 
lot of personal information about the other users irrelevant and makes the set of 
appropriators senior to any given appropriator fixed and easily ascertainable. 
Putting these two aspects together, if a senior appropriator sold rights along with 
land so that the use would not change, no new information would need to be 
acquired. (Changes of use or transfers to someone elsewhere on the watercourse 
require more than this information, and here the system becomes more articulated.) 
Such priority rights are not contextually rich. 
Beyond this limiting principle of first-in-time, however, prior 
appropriation abounds in contextually richer governance rules. First of all, 
governance regimes focus on use, the concept on which prior appropriation is 
based. Only a diversion of water for a beneficial use establishes rights, and only 
continued use can maintain the right (systems vary in how long a pause is 
allowed).
94 Under specified conditions, cessation of use leads to loss of right. 
Contrary to the image sometimes conjured up, prior appropriation does not directly 
give a right to a quantity of water. 
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Water rights under prior appropriation are defined in terms of use.
95 
Historically and to a large extent today, there are not enough water meters to 
measure quantity directly.
96 Rather, a quantity is implicitly defined by observing 
the use of the water. For example, by diverting water to irrigate 200 acres at given 
times, one has established a right to perform this activity using the water. One does 
not have a right to a quantity of water except implicitly.
97 First, what purpose 
water is used for to some extent determines the quantity consumed: water-wheel 
power generation consumes little water, whereas irrigation consumes some water 
but may allow some to return (if the irrigation is in the same watershed).
98 
Second, where the water is used will determine how much is consumed, 
how much returns to the water course, and where the rejoining of the water will 
take place.
99 This is very important because prior appropriation, through the no-
injury rule, protects junior appropriators along the watercourse in their 
appropriations of the return flow from upstream senior appropriators. The no-
injury rule makes water rights under prior appropriation very unique and hard to 
evaluate. But difficulty of measurement is the reason for defining rights to return 
flows implicitly; quantifying rights to return flows would entail far greater 
delineation cost.
100 
Third, the timing of water use can affect the quantity consumed as well as 
the impact on others: some periods correspond to constrictions at certain points on 
the watercourse.
101 The end result is that an appropriator is limited to the 
particulars of his original use to the extent that he does not want to lose water in 
the process of obtaining approval for a transfer or change of use. This result 
certainly makes transfer more difficult but not without reason: from a static point 
of view, nonmodular rights increase utilization of the watercourse by making the 
uses interlock more tightly.
102 For example, the no-injury rule makes water unused 
by senior appropriators more reliably available to junior appropriators. Even the 
much criticized use-it-or-lose-it aspect of prior appropriation makes water 
available to potential appropriators next in line, thereby causing water rights to 
mesh more closely.
103 And, given the state of measurement technology until 
recently, this automatic transfer may have been a cheaper method of transfer than 
defining market-alienable rights to unused water. 
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Unlike the classic exclusion regime, the right here delegates only limited 
discretion over the nature of the use: the water right for irrigation allows one to 
vary the crop and timing within limits but approval from a water board (or as in 
Colorado, a water court) would be required to shift from a use like irrigation to one 
like power generation. Indeed, the need to quantify rights in shifting from one use 
to another (particularly to a more consumptive use) is similar to the quantification 
that occurs as part of the approval process for transfers of water rights from one 
party to another. Transfers of water rights apart from the land they are used on 
inherently require quantification. When water rights are defined in terms of 
specific uses, the use by the new user will almost by definition differ qualitatively 
(at the very least in terms of location). 
Quantity-based measurement mainly happens when an owner proposes a 
major change in use or a transfer to another user that involves a change in the point 
of diversion and the nature of the use. The abundance of quantification in reported 
cases and orders governing these occurrences lends prior appropriation the 
appearance of a quantity-based regime.
104 After highlighting the use-based nature 
of prior appropriation, Nicole Johnson labels it a “hybrid” regime that uneasily 
combines use-based and quantity-based methods for measuring rights, making 
transfers more costly and instream rights more difficult to define.
105 In a sense, 
prior appropriation combines two regimes: a small base of exclusion and much 
governance most of the time and a more exclusion-based quantity-measuring 
regime when it comes to transfers. 
Because of this approach to delineating water rights under prior 
appropriation, if the holder of a water right saves water through an upgrade to his 
irrigation equipment (for example, through better lining of irrigation channels), he 
does not have the right to the conserved water.
106 This feature of prior 
appropriation law has been heavily criticized and has been modified in some states 
to afford appropriators rights to conserved water, but such modification requires 
additional specification of the right (and typically protects third parties’ rights to 
return flows in accord with the no injury rule).
107 More generally, such statutes 
require additional measurement effort. 
Prior appropriation also shows itself as a use regime in the many uses 
reserved for the public. Public trust uses like navigation override prior 
appropriation rights. While all property may be limited by public rights, water 
rights give way to a wide range of robust rights more quickly than do other 
property rights. Further, under prior appropriation the corpus of the water, as 
opposed to the use of the flow, is publicly owned.
108 The Colorado Constitution, in 
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a leading prior appropriation state, declares that all water is owned by the State.
109 
This provision stemmed from the fact that delegating broad authority to owners 
raised fears of monopoly in the formative years of prior appropriation law, and to 
some extent, these fears persist.
110 
For those who normatively would like to see prior appropriation become 
more of a private property regime and who especially would like to facilitate 
transfers, the proposal often surfaces to re-measure prior appropriation rights in 
terms of consumption. This action would bring prior appropriation closer to the 
exclusion model and would simplify the interface between rights, although at the 
cost of a lot of upfront measurement. 
But the interface between rights would still be fairly complex and 
governance-like wherever there are points of constricted flow.
111 Even if rights are 
defined based on consumption, a transfer upstream can cause flow at any point in 
between to deprive another appropriator of water he would have received if the 
diversion had occurred at the original point.
112 In other words, the 
interconnectedness of uses makes modularization of the water rights very difficult. 
And the low level of modularization of rights makes them less easily transferable. 
Modern prior appropriation regimes have additional overlays of 
governance by regulation. Prior appropriation rights are administered by water 
boards. Any change in use or transfer requires a permit from the board. The trend 
is for these regulatory authorities to have additional authority and discretion to 
consider the impact of such proposals (and even of existing uses) on third parties 
and the public interest.
113 In addition, in many Western states, notably California, 
boards must take into account public trust rights and federal reserved water 
rights.
114 In some states, water boards can even force senior appropriators to accept 
substitute sources of water if this substitution will improve the flow for a junior 
appropriation.
115 This “physical solution” to the problem of maximizing use of 
water presents yet another move in the direction of a governance regime in the 
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presence of multiple interacting uses. The addition of this layer of regulation has 
its echoes in regulated riparianism, as well as in land use law in which zoning and 
other regulation have supplemented nuisance law. 
An additional layer of governance can be achieved by organizations that 
either own water rights themselves or regulate members’ water use.
116 Mutuals and 
water districts both implement governance regimes, prescribing terms of use. 
Mutuals can also be regarded as a form of entity property.
117 Entity property makes 
possible a simple message to the outside world but a tailored governance regime 
within the entity. As Thompson demonstrates, water entities, especially mutuals, 
have made intra-entity transfers of water much smoother than they are between 
unrelated external third parties pursuing transfers under the state water statutes.
118 
Overall, Western water law is much more of a governance regime than 
usually thought, and prior appropriation exhibits its greatest orientation toward the 
exclusion strategy at the time of transfers and other changes of use. Partly, the 
emphasis on governance even in the West is a function of the high costs of 
measurement of a fluid resource being put to partly consumptive uses, and we 
should expect increasing emphasis on quantity-based rights with the rise of better 
water-flow models and monitoring methods. But to a large extent the emphasis on 
governance is likely to persist because of the continuing high cost of measurement. 
B. Exclusion in riparianism 
Eastern riparianism is often thought of as a commons with heavy reliance 
on rules of reasonable use. Riparianism, often analogized to nuisance, historically 
has its origins in the law of nuisance.
119 Nuisance is often thought of as all about 
balancing uses, an approach reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
120 
Elsewhere I have argued that nuisance is itself a complex mixture of exclusion and 
governance, although the exclusionary elements of nuisance typically receive far 
less attention than the use-balancing elements.
121 These more exclusionary aspects 
of nuisance include nuisance per se and the central role that physical invasion still 
plays in this law. Analogously, I argue in this Section that riparianism mixes of 
exclusion and governance, and as in the case of nuisance, the exclusionary aspect 
of riparianism has proved easy to overlook. Exclusion plays some cost-minimizing 
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role even in nuisance and riparianism, despite the need in such areas to shift 
readily to governance strategies.  
Riparianism balances uses and makes reasonableness the standard. In 
times of drought, one use will be evaluated against another and ultimately which 
should prevail is a matter for the jury. A use is not unreasonable except as 
compared with another more valuable use, where the uses conflict. Furthermore, in 
some limited situations of no injury to downstream riparians, additional 
governance-style refinement can be achieved through contracts that will run as 
covenants with the land.
122 
Nonetheless riparianism’s use-balancing rests on a foundation of 
exclusion. First, only riparians have riparian rights; they are appurtenant to riparian 
land. Thus, riparianism piggybacks on the basic exclusionary regime over land. 
Further, limiting water rights to riparianism is a rough proxy for quantity.
123 Use of 
rough proxies forms the hallmark of the exclusion strategy.
124 Second, under many 
versions of riparianism water may only be used on riparian land (exceptions can be 
made for rights by grant or prescription). Here, too, a rough proxy based on 
physical location serves very indirectly to measure use. Third, some versions of 
riparianism provide for per se rules. For example, a riparian can use as much as 
she needs for natural wants, which are drinking, household uses, and cattle; these 
take priority over artificial wants, which in a non-arid climate would include 
irrigation and power.
125 This scheme makes context and balancing largely 
irrelevant. In a humid climate, it is unlikely that use for natural purposes will leave 
another with too little water for his natural uses, all of which makes the per se 
approach good enough.
126 As scarcity increases, we might expect a shift towards 
more detailed use rules or to a different regime, like prior appropriation. 
The overlay of governance on a foundation of exclusion also 
characterizes the historical development of riparianism. Prior to riparianism, the 
common law generally held to a simpler system, natural flow.
127 This simple 
system was easy to administer and may well have served as a baseline from which 
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parties could contract in situations in which transaction costs were not prohibitive. 
It establishes a flat rule that each landowner must leave the drainage in its natural 
state, thus giving each landowner a servitude over the other for natural flow.
128 
Like the exclusion strategy, it delimits the number of those with access privileges 
to the riparian landowners (a feature shared by riparianism) and also like exclusion 
employs a noncontextual rough proxy to regulate use: no diminishment of the 
flow. But as use became more intense, the system did too little to accommodate 
even minimally consumptive uses.
129 The historical shift to governance follows 
from the information-cost model and the basic assumptions about the shape of the 
marginal cost curves for the various property rights strategies. It is consistent with 
the broad version of the Demsetz thesis, under which “more property” can involve 
additional governance,
130 but it presents an apparent counterexample to the narrow 
Demsetzian expectation of ever increasing exclusion.
131 And it accords with a 
pattern we find in many other historical examples of the commons.
132 
As scarcity of water in the East has further increased, we have seen a shift 
in about half the riparian states from pure common-law riparianism to regulated 
riparianism.
133 Under regulated riparianism, certain major uses require a permit.
134 
To obtain a permit, the applicant must show the value of the use and its impact on 
others.
135  
Like prior appropriation, Eastern riparianism employs the exclusion 
strategy, albeit to a lesser extent. In riparianism, this element of exclusion is easy 
to overlook because it largely piggybacks on the exclusion regime for (riparian) 
land. Aspects of exclusion in riparian systems include per se rules based on 
categories, appurtenancy, and limits to use on riparian land. Also like prior 
appropriation, riparianism has, in the face of greater scarcity, added further 
elements of governance over time. 
                                                                                                                  
128. 2  WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 47, § 10.03(b)(2); 5 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS § 59.02(b)(3) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., repl. vol. 1998); Stanley V. 
Kinyon & Robert C. McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891, 
893–97 (1940). 
129.  See, e.g., Rose, supra note 31, at 287. 
130.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at S486. 
131.  Morton Horwitz argued that the move from natural flow to the riparian 
reasonableness standard was an example of courts providing new industrial users with a 
“subsidy.” MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 
101–02 (1977). Carol Rose pointed out that, although the subsidy thesis has been criticized 
in general, the move from natural flow to reasonableness does seem to contradict the 
expectation of greater private property with a rise in resource values (and an increase in 
externalities). Rose, supra note 31, at 264. This assumes the narrow version Demsetz thesis. 
132.  See, e.g., NETTING, supra note 2929, at 58–61 (1981) (describing process of 
intensification, expansion, and regulation in medieval Törbel and other Swiss villages in 
which boundaries were fixed and regulation was instituted in late medieval period when 
exclusion was not enough); see also Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: 
Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–36. 
133.  See Dellapenna, supra note 47, § 9.06(c)(2). 
134.  Id. § 9.01. 
135.  Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 47, § 6.01(b)(1). 2008] GOVERNING  WATER  475 
IV. THE WATER SEMICOMMONS AND FLUID PROPERTY 
In combining exclusion with governance, as in both of the regimes 
discussed above, water law is typical of the rest of property law, but the fugitive 
nature of water causes water law to tend in the direction of a semicommons. The 
high and quickly rising cost of the exclusion strategy as applied to water, 
combined with its manifold uses, limits the usefulness of simple exclusion. Many 
users need simultaneous access to the resource, and their uses potentially interact. 
Consequently, the governance systems implemented in prior appropriation, 
riparian water law, and their hybrids necessarily involve detailed specification of 
use. 
I have argued elsewhere that the exclusion strategy helps keep property 
modular.
136 A modular system is one in which interactions are intense within 
modules but less intense between modules. Interface conditions and information 
hiding limit the dependencies between modules, and allow the system to manage 
complexity more easily than one in which the interdependency between any two 
elements of the system is in principle possible. 
Because of the interlocking nature of water uses and the difficulty of 
exclusion, water law cannot be as modular as regular property. Instead, many 
actors with different uses have access to the same resource. Interestingly, water 
uses are more consumptive and heterogeneous in the West, and it is here, where 
interdependencies become very difficult, that we see arguably a greater emphasis 
on exclusion than in riparian water law—although, as I have argued in the Article, 
not to the extent that is usually thought. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider 
water law’s tendency toward allowing access by parties who under other 
conditions might be regulated by very different property regimes. One solution to 
such a problem combines systems in a semicommons. 
Semicommon property rights exist where a resource is covered by both 
common and private property and the two systems potentially interact. For 
example, in the open-field system of medieval and early modern Europe, this 
interaction occurred over time.
137 Peasants would own long thin strips in private 
property for purposes of grain growing. In fallow periods and after harvests the 
peasants would be required to throw open their strips to common grazing. This 
allowed small-scale private ownership with intensive incentives for crop growing 
but operation on a larger scale for grazing, which involved greater economies of 
scale. The resulting commons was not open access: only those with strips had a 
right to graze and a right to the manure from the grazing animals. Internally 
however, exclusion was quite limited: spillovers could occur along the many 
extensive boundaries between long, narrow strips (e.g., poor weeding, 
encroachments), and in the commons periods peasants might selectively trash the 
parts of the commons that belonged to others (e.g., by excessive trampling) or 
favor their own parts (with manure from commonly grazed animals).
138 Elsewhere, 
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I have argued that the configuration of strips minimized the ability of peasants to 
engage in the latter forms of strategic behavior.
139 
The general challenge of a semicommons is that a pattern of valuable uses 
requires extensive access by multiple parties. If the uses individually call for 
different scales or different levels of exclusion, reconciling the multiple use can be 
difficult. The nature of the resource and its uses make modularization difficult: 
multiple interlocking uses are valuable but hard to police. A semicommons 
converts the problem of interacting uses into a problem of interacting property 
systems. Sometimes these problems are easier to solve or tolerate. When this is so 
is an empirical question to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
A semicommons like the open field system is easy to misinterpret as 
needlessly complicated, and hybrid water law systems likewise have usually been 
assumed to be inherently unstable and undesirable. The present theory suggests 
that hybrid water systems may not be anomalous or purely the product of path 
dependence. Mark Kanazawa’s argument that the hybrid system is efficient in 
California is consistent with this view.
140 In particular his empirical study suggests 
that the California Supreme Court when faced with riparian objections to 
appropriations employed an exclusion-like strategy of injunctions regardless of 
injury when the number of affected parties was small and arguably transaction 
costs were low,
141 and moved to a rule of reason, a governance strategy, in the 
presence of many riparians and high transaction costs.
142 Further, Kanazawa shows 
that over time, the likelihood of applying the rule of reason increased regardless of 
riparian numbers.
143 This evidence suggests that the hybrid regime tends to apply 
governance precisely where the information-cost theory predicts: where stakes are 
high and high transaction costs prevent private supply of governance solutions.
144 
Also, in the riparian systems, the tendency to allow for prescriptive rights, the 
passage of Mill Acts, and other pockets of appropriation law, bring riparianism 
closer to a semicommons. Given the nature of fluid property, the possibility 
remains open that such mixtures make sense, given the high cost of measurement 
of water and the high value of multiple types of use.  
The rapid shift to governance and other moves away from simple 
exclusion, characteristic of a semicommons, trace back to the nature of fugitive 
resources. Almost by definition, a fugitive resource is difficult to subject to 
exclusion rights, and this problem impacts the shape of rights to water, wild 
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animals, oil and gas, and the broadcast spectrum.
145 This difficulty of exclusion 
also underlies the much misunderstood ferae naturae analogies.
146 I n  s o m e  o f  
these resources, multiple use will require either tolerating interference or the use of 
hybrid systems whose components themselves need to be reconciled. In the 
medieval open fields the reconciling device was the scattered pattern of strips, 
which made strategic differentiation of parcels in the common-property use more 
difficult. More usually, semicommons require extensive governance rules to make 
up for what they lack in the ability to manage conflict through exclusion.
147 Thus, 
in a variety of areas in addition to water law, including broadcast spectrum and 
intellectual property, we should expect a semicommons, and an emerging literature 
suggests that semicommons are characteristic of these areas.
148 Even the ultra-
familiar example of fugitive resources, wild animals, employ governance regimes 
to the extent that first possession itself can be regarded as a system regulating the 
acquisitive competitive process itself. That is, if possession law itself is about 
“things,” the thing is, as in unfair competition law, an “opportunity.”
149 But like 
water, an opportunity is an ethereal resource. And to the extent this is so, we tend 
to find tort-like rules of governance over these abstract resources. 
Water law does point to lessons for property law more generally, but I 
suggest that water law exemplifies the combination of minimal exclusion and 
extensive governance with a corresponding tendency toward a semicommons that 
are characteristic of property regimes over fugitive resources. Using the 
framework outlined here it should be possible to develop a theory of “fluid 
property,” a task I leave for further work. 
CONCLUSION 
Like other property law, the law of water mixes exclusion and 
governance. Exclusion is familiar and more central in the case of prior 
appropriation than in riparianism, but both common-law water regimes shift to 
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governance quite quickly, especially as compared to more familiar real and 
personal property law. This shift to governance helps explain some features of 
prior appropriation law that are puzzling as long as it is thought to be an exclusive 
parcelized regime. In this Article, I have provided an information-cost framework 
for analyzing property rights in general and water rights in particular. This 
framework shows how a Demsetzian shift to more property can lead to increases in 
the use of the exclusion or the governance strategy and when we might expect 
which combinations. As in the case of other fugitive resources, the nature of the 
water resource makes the marginal cost of exclusion rise very rapidly, causing a 
quick resort to governance and the emergence of various types of semicommons. 